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Volume 2 of Liesbet Hooghe and Gary Marks’ ambitious series is a slim and elegant 
book. This is especially so in comparison to Volume 1, a book chunkily rich in methodology 
and data, and well worth its non-trivial weight. Volume 2, by contrast, is a mere 162 pages 
of text. But the insights it contains are remarkable. It is an analytical tour de force that will 
change how we think about governance across space for decades to come. 
Let me discuss first what I most like about this book. There is a great deal to like, so 
let me focus on those things I found most striking on my initial reading. First, this is an 
immensely – and yet effortlessly – learned piece of scholarship. It is the product of years of 
work and study, not just by its principal authors, but by a larger team of colleagues and 
graduate students who toiled with them to corral a vast trove of information, and then 
fashioned it into the novel and immensely useful Regional Authority Index dataset.  That 
done, they spent years analyzing the data in ways that eventually led to this book. 
Community, Scale, and Regional Governance is a rich contribution to theory. But it 
is one based on a deep and detailed knowledge of the political economy of subnational 
and supranational governance across all of the world’s regions. This expertise is 
remarkable not just for the breadth of countries covered – the scope is global – but also for 
the depth of knowledge within each country. Many of the world’s 190+ countries are 
geographically, socially, and politically highly diverse. Much of political science skates over 
this diversity, focusing on national systems and national political characteristics. But as an 
increasing number of scholars have argued in recent years (Boone 2014, Diaz-Cayeros 
2006, Eaton 2006, Faguet 2012, and Faguet and Pöschl 2015), this is a mistake insofar as 
it obscures the subnational tensions that often determined important national outcomes, 
beneath a façade of national homogeneity and the presumption of equilibrium in 
institutional design. Here, Hooghe and Marks take the opposite tack, plumbing the levels 
and dimensions of countries’ subnational diversity in an explicit attempt to understand 
where this diversity comes from, and how it affects subnational and national governance. 
The book displays this broad and deep knowledge in ways that are illuminating, 
lend weight to its arguments, and are interesting in and of themselves. And through all this 
learnedness it avoids becoming pedantic, even as the authors move seamlessly – often in 
the same sentence – from the political and administrative details of regional governments 
in the Andes, to municipalities in Europe, and then island administrations in Southeast 
Asia. The effect on the reader is informative, and even inspirational, as we watch the 
authors polish each piece of analysis carefully before adding it to their edifice. 
Secondly, the book deploys an interdisciplinary political economy approach. This is 
not only close to my own heart – though it is – but also strictly advantageous for the 
analysis of governance institutions in a social context. Over recent decades, our 
awareness of the power of institutions to affect a broad array of outcomes across the 
economy, social relations, and political systems has grown. As a result, the analysis of 
institutions and institutional change sits less and less comfortably within the confines of 
any single discipline. If the sources of institutional change are multidisciplinary, and their 
effects are multidisciplinary, then their analysis – if it is to be coherent and complete – 
should be interdisciplinary. 
Hooghe and Marks’ work fits the bill. Their take on “political economy” here is a 
blend of public economics and political sociology. This combination is particularly well-
suited to an analysis of public goods, scale economies, externalities, and informational 
asymmetries that is embedded in a broader social context of community and identity. The 
authors are clearly well-versed in both fields, and their approach is gratifyingly unified, 
blending what are, in the end, two very different subfields into a supple, coherent analytical 
tool. 
Thirdly, the book is well and clearly written, even as the ideas expressed are both 
deep and powerful. It is a pleasure to read. This is not something that can be said of many 
academic books, and even fewer books of theory. It reads as finest liquor – centuries of 
thinking and a wealth of data distilled into a compact purity of form. I could go on, but 
Hooghe and Marks’ words are preferable. So let me instead quote two examples: 
What principles underpin governance? One must begin by asking which group of persons 
should form a jurisdiction. This is the Who Question: who should have the right to make 
collectively binding decisions? Only after persons are conceived as members of a group 
does it make sense to ask how that group should make decisions. Democracy does not 
provide an answer. The principles that underpin democracy say nothing about who the 
people are. Majority rule, yes, but a majority of which people? Minority rights, but in relation 
to which majority? Principles of democracy, justice, or individual rights do not tell one which 
groups of persons should exercise governance to achieve these goods.  The fundamental 
question of governance – the Who Question – is logically and ontologically prior to 
questions relating to how a group makes decisions or what those decisions are.  A theory of 
governance should, at a minimum, seek to explain the territorial structure of authority: 
which groups at which scales have authority to make what kinds decisions? (p.5) 
And also, 
Providing individuals with the policies they want is not the same as giving them the 
authority to collectively determine those policies. Self-rule is the independent exercise of 
authority. So, individuals may demand self-rule even if the central government tailors public 
goods to their preferences. The reason for this takes one to the core of governance, the 
exercise of legitimate power. 
Power is a capacity unlike any other because it is the present means to obtain some 
future good (Hobbes 1651/2001). It is the potential to realize one’s will in the face of 
resistance. Unlike money, it is not depleted when it is spent. With what might a people 
exchange the power to make its laws? This is precisely why conflict over the allocation of 
authority can be so difficult to resolve. Power, and its legitimate expression, authority, are 
master goods that relieve the bearer from trusting in the promises of others. 
A theory of governance should explain the institutional frame – the structure of 
authority – in which policies for this community, rather than that community, are decided. 
Knowledge about policy preferences, no matter how precise, cannot explain preferences 
over which groups should have the right to exercise collective authority. Preferences over 
governance are shaped by group attachments as well as by policy preferences. (pp.16-17) 
This is clear, deep, beautiful prose. 
What does this book achieve? First, it provides a coherent theory of government at 
the intersection of public economics (public goods) and the sociality of jurisdictional design 
(how people feel and act with respect to their communities). This is a blend not just across 
disciplines, but also hierarchical styles, combining the top-down analysis of public goods 
provision with the bottom up analysis of social groups as a function of identity. 
Second, it restates the famous Oates decentralization theorem, which holds that 
governments should centralize where necessary, based on scale economies and 
externalities, and decentralize where possible.  But it does so in a more robust way, 
adding to Oates’ public goods criteria a crucial second dimension: sociality. 
Third, it synthesizes quantitative, large-N methods with qualitative, small-N analysis 
successfully. This gives the book both breadth and depth. Hooghe and Marks are able to 
plumb the nuanced causes of governance arrangements in particular municipalities and 
regions that are highly illustrative, and at the same time generalize about the causes and 
consequences of different governance arrangements across most of the countries of the 
world. This is no mean feat. 
Fourth, the deployment of these “Q2” tools allows the authors to probe the deep 
drivers of decentralization/multilevel governance, rather than treating these phenomena as 
black holes – institutional givens in particular places at particular times, whose effects may 
be analyzed, but whose provenance is unknown. Placing decentralization and multilevel 
governance at the center of the frame is an intellectual exercise at least as important as 
studying their effects, and often a more fertile one. 
Fifth, their concept of the Ladder of Governance sheds light on a striking regularity 
across countries, cultures, and regions of the world with a simple tool that is as elegant as 
it is far-reaching. Jurisdictional tiers, according to Hooghe and Marks, will be “arrayed at 
roughly equal intervals on an exponential population scale. The design will take the form of 
a Russian doll arrangement. The result is an elegant functional design which limits the 
number of jurisdictional levels, adjusts policy provision to scale diversity, and simplifies 
coordination by nesting each lower-level jurisdiction within a single jurisdiction at a higher 
level (Hooghe and Marks 2009).” (p.12) This gives shape to a rough intuition we all have, 
but which few of us previously understood. 
At the end of a tour de force that marries the hierarchical analysis of public goods 
provision with the political sociology of identity and community formation, where can we go 
next? Which questions do Hooghe and Marks leave unanswered? For any productive 
piece of research, the answer is many, of course. One that strikes me is that adding issues 
of political party structure, and in particular parties’ internal structures, to key 
characteristics of multilevel governance is likely to result in a fertile line of inquiry. 
The importance of the internal structures of political parties has been largely 
overlooked, but is hard to overstate. Consider a few of the exceptions. Ardanaz et al. 
(2014) show how internal pressures within Argentina’s political parties shaped both 
congressional dynamics and fiscal policy, leading to Argentina’s macroeconomic disaster 
at the turn of the millennium. Myerson (2014) and Myerson et al. (2015) tie internal political 
party structure to the stability of institutional reform, including decentralization itself, and to 
political stability more generally. Faguet (2017a and 2017b) show how the move to 
multilevel governance in Bolivia fatally undermined a highly centralized political party 
system, populated by internally centralized parties. Decentralization facilitated the creation 
of new, regionally and locally-specific parties and movements, undermining the national 
political party system, which disintegrated from the bottom up. 
These examples underline the larger point that politics affects governance, and 
governance affects politics. Each system operates simultaneously and continuously, at 
different levels of hierarchy and spatial aggregation. The study of how these parallel 
systems interact with one another, and their mutual effects on outcomes of interest that 
are further afield, such as corruption or economic growth, are areas where the application 
of Hooghe and Marks’ analytical framework are likely to reap rich rewards in future. 
Scholars who choose to go down this path will do well to mimic Hooghe and Marks’ 
methodological rigor, analytical style, and clarity of thought and expression. 
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